A C A M E D I A

Western leaders are assuming that economic privation — the result of their sanctions regime — will compel a change in Tehran’s calculations regarding its nuclear program, but the North Korean experience is not a supportive case study. In the face of crippling sanctions and political isolation, the leadership in Pyongyang has concluded that its nuclear and missile programs are its most valuable bargaining chips — indeed, a failed test of a long-range missile and a possibly imminent nuclear weapon test show that Pyongyang is pressing on with these priorities regardless of the international consequences. Meanwhile, North Korea’s internal security forces, the most repressive in the world, have successfully suppressed any grumbling over the country’s collapsed economy. North Korea’s economy is a basket case due to both international sanctions and the regime’s need to maintain tight political control over society, but that has reinforced, not lessened, the government’s repressive tendencies.